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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
DIVORC--OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION-Is THE RESIDENCE

REQUIREMENT XURISDICTIONAL?

NTOT INFREQUENTLY, attorneys find themselves faced with the
problem of -prosecuting or defending a collateral attack
upon a decree of divorce in which the argument is made that
the court which granted the divorce lacked jurisdiction to
render it. In the-great majority of these cases, the argument
is based on the-contention- that neither of the parties was
domiciled within the state where the divorce was granted.
Occasionally, however, a different argument is heard: that
the plaintiff in the original divorce action had failed to fulfill a period of residence set up by statute before bringing the
action for divorce, and that the divorce is consequently void.
Both of these arguments are addressed to the jurisdiction of
the court which granted' the divorce. Domicil of at least one
of the parties in the state where a divorce decree was rendered is the ultimate jurisdictional fact upon which a decree of
divorce must rest in every American state., The argument that
such domicil was lacking, if proven, will invalidate the divorce
everywhere.2 Unless at least one of the parties to the divorce
action is domiciled with it, no state may properly decree'a
divorce.8 If one of the parties to the action is domiciled within
it, any state may grant a divorce which, generally speaking,
wili be binding in every other state under the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution.4
3 Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U. S. 287 (1942); Smith v. Smith, 7 N. D.
404, '74 N.W. 783 (1898); Graham v. Graham, 9 N.D. 88, 81 N.W. 44 (1899).
2 Williams v. North Carolina 11, 825 U.S. 226 (1944); State v. Najjar, 63 A.
2d 807 (1949 New Jersey); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N. E. 2d 60
(1948), 62 Hav.L.IR. 181 (1949).
s Smith v. Smith, 7 N. D. 404, 74 N. W. 783 (1898).
4 This statement does not apply to all phases of the marital relation. In Estin
v. Estin, 384 U.S. 541 (1948), 83 MINN. L. R. 807 (1949), the United States
Suprem- Court held that an ex parts divorce granted to a husband in Nevada did
not affect the obligation of the husband to pay alimony under a prior New York
decree of separation, stating that while the Nevada divorce was effective to change
the husband's marital status so that he could marry again, it did not end the
wife's property rights under the New York separation decree, which did not fall
with the breaking of the marital tie. Since the wife was not subject to the jurls.
diction of the Nevada courts, her property interests could not be affected by an
in personam decree. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "The result in this
situation is to make the divorce divisible-to give effect to the Nevada decree
insofar as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the issue of
alimony." 834 U. S. 541, 549. Compare Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59
N. W. 1017 (1894). It should be borne in mind that the relationship created by
marriage has several aspects. Professor Bingham pungently states: "This legal
relation-is not asingle legal tie of right--and duty between -the epouses, suech as
must be wholly severed or not severed at all, althbugh perhaps altered somewhat,
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An additional requirement to that of domicil is. set up
in almost every state. Statutory enactments regulate the
length of time which a plaintiff must spend in residence within
the state before being permitted to bring an action for divorce.
The authorities are unanimous to the effect that when a plea
is made that a plaintiff in a pending divorce action has not
lived in the state the required length of time, such a plea, if
proven, will abate the action. But another situation can arise,
illustrated by a case which the North Dakota court decided.
The factual. situation in that case was this:
W, the wife, was a native born domiciliary of the state of
North Dakota. H, her husband, was a native born domiciliary
of Minnesota. They were married in 1938, settling in Minnesota. Matrimonial difficulties arose, causing them to separate
several times, the final separation occuring in August, 1942.
By operation of law, the domicil of the husband is also the
domicil of the wife, so that by her marriage W had lost her
domicil in North Dakota and become domiciled in Minnesota.
Following the separation, W moved back to North Dakota, intending to reside in the state permanently. Two months later
she filed suit for divorce in the North Dakota courts. North
Dakota requires a period of twelve months "bona fide" residence in the state by the plaintiff immediately preceding the
filing of any action for divorce. H filed an answer denying
that W had met the residence requirement but withdrew the
answer after a settlement concerning details of the divorce
was reached by the parties. The case thereafter was tried by
default and a decree of divorce was entered only four months
after W had returned to North Dakota. Thereafter H moved
to have the decree set aside, contending that the court had
lacked jurisdiction torender it because of W's failure to live
in the state the required period of time preceding the commencement of the action. It was held that the court acquired
jurisdiction when W reacquired a domicil in North Dakota;
that failure to comply with the residence requirement was an
irregularity which did not go to the court's jurisdiction; and
as for instance by a decree of sep'aration. It is... a conceptual conglomerate
of a7 multitude of paiticular legal incidents, some of which may be altered or
destr6yed *ithout affecting the others." Birigham, i the Matter of Haddock v.
Had.ck, 21 Coanx L .Q. 893 (1986). See 2 Bsvio,, MAJtRLw, DivoRC8 Am Sied. 1891). It has, however, been definitely settled that the
ARAI0N, Sec. 85 (lt
status 'created by marriage Is not a contractual one In the ordinary sense of the
teri. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887).
5 N. D. Rev. Cede (1943) Sec. 14-0517.
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that while the lower court might have .erred in granting the
divorce decree, the error was not one in excess of the court's
jurisdiction but merely an error in the exercise of j urisdiction.
Consequently, no appeal having been taken from the original.
decree, it could not be disturbed after the period of appeal
had expired. Schierstrom v. Schillerstrom.6
It is clear that if the lower court had lacked jurisdiction to
grant the decree, as H contended, the divorce would have been
void and could have been attacked at any time. If W had not
been a domiciliary of North Dakota the court would have been
without the necessary jurisdiction. This is because a state has
no interest in the marital status of persons who are not domiciled within it. Following this general principle, in Smith v.
Smith the North Dakota court denied a decree of divorce to
an employee of the United States treasury who had come to
the state and established a technical residence upon which he
relied to enable him to take advantage of the state's then
liberal divorce laws, but who had never acquired domicil
inNorth Dakota. The position was reiterated a year later in
Grahamv. Graham,8 the court denying a divorce to a wife who
had fulfilled the statutory period of residence but had never
become domiciled here. Both of these cases, in which domfcil
was lacking although the residence requirement had been met,
present situations precisely converse to that in Schillerstrom
v. Schillerstrom, where domicil was present but the residence
requirement had not been fulfilled.
In the federal courts domicil is something which may be
acquired instantaneously. 9 "'Home' in the domiciliary sense
can be changed in the twinkling of an eye, the time it takes
a man to make up his mind to remain where he is when he is
away from home. He need do no more than decide, by a flash
of thought, to stay 'either permanently or for an indefinite
or un'!mited length of time.' No other. connection of- perma6a-N.
D. -. 32 N.W. 2d 106, 2 A.L.R. 2d 271 (1948).
7 7 N.D. 404, 74 N.W. 783 (1898).
8 9 N. D. 88, 81 N.W. 44 (1899).
9 "Domicil is the place with which a person has a settled connection-for certain
legal purposes, either because his home is there, or because that place Is assigned
to him by the law." RESTATEMEwr, CoNICT'r o9 LAws, Sec. 9. (1984). N.-D.RevCode (1943) See. 54-0126 uses the term "residence" as synonymous with "domicil"
in setting forth the rules by which domicil is to be determined 4 the North
Dakota courts. Northwestern Mortgage & Security Co. v. Noel -Construction Co.
and. J. A. Carter, 71 N. D. 256, 300 N.W. 28 (1941). See. Gronna, Domicil, of
Absent Defendant as Basis for in Personam Jurisiction, 24 N. D._ BAit B uEts 4
(1948).
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nence is required.." 10 Taken at face value, however, the decisions of many state courts appear to apply a different criterion
for determining domicil, confusing the requirement that a
plaintiff acquire domicil in the state with the requirement of a
specfied period of residence. Thus, the books are full of statements that residence in a state for some prescribed length of
time is a prerequisite which must be fulfilled before the court
has "jurisdiction" to grant a divorce. The North Dakota court
is among the many which have made this statement-in
Smith v. Smith, supra, and Graham v. Graham, supra-but it
stated this, language was subject to "construction" in the
Schilerstrom case.
Actually, of course, the federal courts recognize that a
state court has jurisdiction over a divorce action the instant
that one of the parties to the action becomes domiciled within
it-that is, the court acquires jurisdiction which the federal
courts will recognize and respect in the instant that one of the
parties to a divorce action undergoes the "flash of thought" of
which Mr, Justice Rutledge spoke. But as one legal writer
points out, a state court's interpretation of the word "domicil"
does not need to be precisely square with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the term in all respects. "Undoubtedly a
ctate may give a content to the concept of domicil more difficult to satisy than any minimum that would satisfy the
Supreme Court."" It seems probable that in a number of
states, domicil sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of a
divorce action is acquired only after the residence requirement
has-been met.
Examination of the residence requirement statutes of the
10 Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U. S.
226, 257 (19"). The entire concept of domicil has been attacked by many legal
writers as well as by Justice Rutledge on the ground that It does not furnish an
effective basis for determining jurisdiction in divorce actions. "The requirement
of-domicil for the plaintiff in a divorce action Is doubtless a vestige of the histric
fact that divorce was the business of a special court which was distinctly not open
even to all the King's subjects ....
It has come to seem that a state has the
power of granting divorce only to those who in a special way are members of the
state body. It is hard to see how this can be justified under a judicial system
like-ours, to which aliens - even aliens -incapable of eitizenship - have access on
the game -tqrnn as- itisens.. .Attention.is called to the fact that no question Is
raised- about the- sate's right to hear-a divorce suit when the.requirement of
residence is the relatively long one of a year or more. But If-it is- really absence
of domicil that renders a state court incompetent to hear a plaintm In a divorce
action, even a year is not enough without more." Radin, The Authenticated ull
Faith and Credit Claws, 89 ILL. L. R. 1, 81 (1944).
It Holt. Axy Moe Lght on Hladdook v. Haddock? 89 Micn.' L..R. 6M9, 695
(1940).
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various states shows that such statutes may be divided into
two classifications: (1) those which simply declare that a
plaintiff must reside in the state. for some specified period: of
time in order to be entitled to maintain his action,12 and
(2) those which express a legislative intent that the court shall
not have jurisdiction to hear any divorce action unless the
plaintiff has fulfilled the requirement of residence within the
state for some definite period of time.13
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that in those states
having the second type of statute a result opposite to that
reached in Schillerstrom v. Schillerstrom might be correct. It
would appear that in those states the legislature has done
what Professor Holt suggested might be done, and given "a
content to the concept of domicil more difficult to satisfy than
any minimum that would satisfy the Supreme Court." 1
In states which have the first type of statute, however, it
would seem on principle that the result reached in Schillerstrom v. Schierstrom would be both logical and correct. Such
statutes, similar to that in North Dakota, nowhere mention
jurisdiction. On their face, they simply prescribe a condition
precedent which a plaintiff must fulfill before bringing the
action of divorce. Thus, in Aucutt v. Aucutt,'5 the Texas court
constiuqd such a statute as prescribing the qualifications of
the pWntiff alone, and held that a defendant could be granted
a divorce on his cross-action without having resided in the
state for the statutory period of time, since the statutory qualification did not apply to him. The California court has held
such a residence requirement nonjurisdictional in its nature.
In Kelsey v. MUller' it was held that where a husband had obtained a Tennessee divorce without meeting Tennessee's residence requirement, his second marriage was valid, since, apIrN-th Dakota's statute is typical. "A divorce must not be granted unless
the plaintiff In good faith has been a resident of the state for twelve months next
preceding the commencement of the action...." N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec.
14-0517.
1s Among states possessing the second type of statute are Connecticut, Delaware, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia and Wisconsin.
The Mississippi statute, the most definite of this group, provides: "Jurisdiction
Limited.-The jurisdiction of the chancery court in suits. for divorce shall be
confined to the following cases: (&) Where one of the parties has been a bona Ade
reident within this state for 'one year next preceding the commencement of the
sult."- Miss. Code (1942) See. 2786.
,"Note 11, supra.
is 122 Tex. 518, 62 S.W. 2d 77, 89 A.L.R. 1198 (1933).
16208 Cal. 61, 263 P. 200 (1928); Accord, DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal. 2d
621, 165 P. 2d 457 (1946).
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plying the presumption that Tennessee law was similar to
California law,.the divorce was good because failure to meet
the residence requirement did not defeat the court's jurisdiction in California. In Kern v. Field,1t the Minnesota court held
tha where a wife went to North Dakota, established a residence and obtained a divorce on constructive service, failure
to reside in the state for the required period of time was an
irregularity which was nonjurisdictional. This holding was
based on the precedent set in "Thurston v. Thurston, s which
held that where a husband, domiciled with his wife in Minnesota, deserted the wife and acquired a residence in Washington where in two or three months he began an action for
divorce which was granted, the divorce was to be considered
valid, since the lack of residence for the prescribed length of
time in Washington was an error which did not defeat the
Washington court's jurisdiction.' 9
On the other hand, many of the courts having the first type
of statute-that is, the type not mentioning jurisdiction-have
:onstrued the residence requirement to be jurisdictional in its
nature by a line of decisions using language so explicit that
it is difficult to see how they could consistently reach the result
of Schiller8trom v. Schillerstrom. In Fleming v. Fleming,"P brought an action of divorce without having fulfilled the
six-month residence requirement within the county where the
divorce was sought required by Nevada statutes of that time.
In holding that P was required to be physically present in the
county during the six months, the Nevada court said: "...By
the provisions of this statute, actual residence, as distinguished
from domicil or legal residence, was made the basis upon which
17 68 Minn. 317, 71 N. W. 393, 64 Am. St. Rep. 479 (1897).
18 58 Minn. 279, 59 N.W. 1017 (1894).
19 Commenting on this type of case, Professor Goodrich states: "As has been
-4tated, a divorce decree must have been granted by the court of the jurisdiction
if it is to have recognition elsewhere. The term used in statutes prescribing
requirements for divorce actions is generally 'residence.' This is a!most uniformly
interpreted as meaning 'domicil.' In addition to the requirement that one must
he domiciled within a state before he can get a divorce there, statutes frequently
require residence for a given period of time. Such a provision may be interpreted
to mean that the individual must have been domiciled within the jurisdiction for
this period or as sometimes held, that he or she must not'only have been domiciled
but must have an actual residence there for the prescribed time as well.
"Such conditions may be enacted by the lawmaking body of any state as a
matter of local policy. To secure a divorce, a party must comply with them.
They do not affect the international requirement for Jurisdiction, which is based
on domieil, but are additions to it." GOODSCH, CoVM.wt oF LAwS, (1926), See.
1

.4.

:'o36 Nev. 135, 134 P. 445 (1913).
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courts would determine the status of the party litigant and
acquire jurisdiction. In this respect, residence must be distinguished from domicil." -1 Likewise, in Glassman v. Glas.
man,22 the Ohio court stated: "Such residential requirements
in state statutes have been almost universally held to be jufisdictional in character. If the plaintiff in a divorce action has
not been a resident of the state for the period prescribed by
statute, the trial court has no jurisdiction to consider the action and any judgment rendered in such a proceeding is absolutely void, in the state of trial and elsewhere." Such dicta,
though arising in cases in which a direct appeal was made
from the decree of divorce, clearly cover the situation presented by a collateral attack such as was made in Schillerstrom
v. Schillerstrom.
A result precisely opposite to the holding of the Schillerstrom case was reached in Martin v. Martin,23 an Alabama
decision. A divorce decree granted by one county was held void
when attacked in a collateral suit on the ground the residence
requirement within the county had not been met. Since the
residence requirement was jurisdictional in its nature, the
court stated, failure to meet it deprived the court of jurisdiction and made the divorce decree entirely void.
The most interesting case holding contra to Schillerstrom
v. Schillerstrom is Adams v. Adams,2 decided by the Massachusetts court. In that case, P, an illegitimate child, sued to
recover inheritance rights in his father's Massachusetts estate, claiming that he had been legitimized by the subsequent
marriage of his parents in California after his father had
obtained a divorce from his first wife in California though he
had not complied with the California residence requirement.
Justice Holmes, at that time a member of the Massachusetts
court, held that the requirement of residence went to the
court'- jurisdiction and that the divorce was therefore invalid.
The decision was based on the assumption that in California
the requirement of length of residence went to the court's
power to deal with a divorce case and that failure to comply
with the residence requirement made the divorce void ab initio
for lack of jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that California courts subsequently held precisely the opposite-that
21 134 P. 446.
2276 Ohio App.

47, 60 N. E. 2d 716 (1944).
•23178 Ala. 106, 55 So. 632 (1911).
24 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L.RA. 275 (1891).
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is, that failure to reside in the state for the period set up
by statute was not a defect which deprived the court of

jurisdiction.2
The question of whether a divorce obtained on residence
insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of the state
wherein granted is entitled to full faith and credit in other
states is still an open one so far as most courts are concerned,
despite the cases just cited. However, the majority of the
courts which have considered this problem have arrived at the
conclusion that a divorce granted on such insufficient residence
is valid as against collateral attack.
The legal writers who have considered this subject all appear to have reached the conclusion that the residence requirement is not jurisdictional in its nature. "It is sometimes held
that the divorce is invalid although the court granting the
divorce found that the required length of residence had been
fulfilled if it can be shown to another court that the statutory
period of residence was lacking. But the better view and the
one more generally held is that this, not being a matter of
international jurisdiction, and the court therefore acting
within its jurisdiction in the international sense, had power
to find the fact, and, finding
the fact, to grant the divorce,"
26
states Professor Beale.
It seems clear that the result reached in Schillerstrom v.
Schiflerstrom states the correct rule for those states having
the type of residence statute which does not in terms purport
to be jurisdictional. This, however, is no guarantee that the
correct result will be reached in every case. If the residence
requirement is construed by the courts of the state where
recognition is sought for the divorce as being an addition to
the concept of domicil-that is, as a refusal to accept the
plaintiff as a domiciliary of the state where the divorce was
granted until the residence requirement has been met-then
the result that the divorce was invalid could be reached consistently with constitutional principles.
No case involving such an interpretation of the residence
requirements has ever been passed upon by the Supreme Court
of the United States. The question of how far, if at all, a state
will be permitted to incorporate a residence requirement into
25 Se

note 16. supra.

261 Be-.a ComNucT

or LAWS. SeC. 110.5.
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tne concept of domicil as a part of its local policy has there-

fore never been settled.
Since decrees of divorce, especially those granted by default,'7 are open to collateral attack of such a wide range
anyway, it would seem wiser not to allow a new avenue of
assault upon them to be opened. The obtaining of default
divorces has become such an unsatisfactory procedure, involving the risk of prosecution for bigamy if the divorce is

attacked

successfully after a remarriage,

8

and possibly

finally leaving the litigants half married and half divorced,'2
that a definite rule in this regard would inject a welcomed area
of certainty into a field of law which has become sadly confused.3"
Precisely the same objections can be made to setting aside
a decree of divorce on the ground the residence requirement

was not complied with as can be made to setting aside a
divorce on the ground that domicil within the state where
the divorce was granted was lacking. Undoubtedly if a person
married again in reliance upon a divorce which was later set

aside because of failure to meet the residence requirement of
the state which granted the divorce, he would be subject to
prosecution for bigamy just as he would be if he married
again in reliance upon a divorce later set aside for lack of
domicil. The confusion of the law relating to this subject
.1Where the defendant in an action of divorce goes to the state where the
divorce is sought, or otherwise appears in the action, the divorce cannot later
be questioned by the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was not domiciled
within the state which granted the divorce, since the doctrine of res judicata
applies. ". . . The requirements of full faith and credit bar a defeudant from
collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts
of a sister state where there has been participation by the defendant in the
divorce proceedings..
" stated Chief Justice Vinson in Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343. 351 (1948), 33 MiNN. L. R. 317 (1949). See Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S.
378 (1948).
is W-l!iams v. North Carolina 1, 317 U S 287 (1942) ; Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U. S. 226 (1944)
29 See footnote 4, supra.
3o Rice v. Rice, 335 U. S. 842 (1949), held that where a husband left his wife.
moved to Nevada, obtained a divorce on constructive service and married another
woman, the divorce could be attacked on jurisdictional grounds in Connecticut,
the state of matrimonial domicil, thus opening the way to a finding that P, the
first wife, was the husband's legal heir to certain real estate in Connecticut.
Justice Jackson, dissenting, pointed out what he termed a "study in contrasts."
Nevada had power to dissolve the marriage of a woman who never went there,
never Invoked its law or courts, and never submitted herself to Its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the courts of any other state had power to find that Nevada
never had jurisdiction of a man who went into that state, Invoked its law and
submitted himself to Its courts. Jackson began his dissent by quoting Shakespeare: "Confusion now hath made his masterpiece."
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makes a divorced person's liberty hinge "upon his ability to
'guess' at what may ultimately be the legal and factual conclusion resulting from a consideration of two of the most uncertain word symbols in all the judicial lexicon, 'jurisdiction'
and 'domicil.' -31
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM
Third Year Law Student.

" Justice Black, dissenting in Williams v. North C;,rolina II. 325 V. S 226
(1944

